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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY AMELIA WOOD, HAZEL 
STEVENS, LLOYD WARNER -
Guardian at Litem for Nancy Louise 
Ovard, WAYNE JOHN STERLING 
and DEAN J. HADFIELD, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
WALTER L. BUDGE, Attorney 
General of Utah, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
9541 
No. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the Attorney General, Walter L. 
Budge, from the judgment and mandate of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County ordering him to pay certain moneys to 
plaintiffs and respondents. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
The District Court of Salt Lake County had granted re-
spondents' petition for writ of mandamus and issued a writ 
con1pelling the defendant and appellant, Walter L. Budge, 
Attorney General of Utah, to pay thetn the sums appropriated 
for their benefit by the Utah Legislature. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
That the judgment and mandate of the District Court be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth by appellant is substan-
tially correct. However, respondents disagree with certain 
things therein set forth and feel that certain other material 
facts are omitted. 
Appellant asserts throughout his brief that the claims of 
plaintiffs and respondents were denied by the Board of Exami-
ners. This is not so. The fact is that the Board of Examiners, 
after it examined each claim, merely transmitted it to the 
Legislature with the recommendation that the claim be denied. 
R. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 40, Finding of Fact No. 5, and, Exhibit D-2. 
It is important also for this Court to consider the following 
additional facts clearly evidenced in the record but which were 
not set forth in the Statement of Facts of appellant: That no 
part of these claims had ever been paid by the State (R. 39); 
that the State of Utah is immune from suit (R. 39); and, 
that the Attorney General did issue an opinion concerning the 
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applicability of Article VII~ Section 13 of the Utah Consti-
tution, which fact, however, has no materiality or relevancy 
to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE ONLY PROPER AND ADEQUATE REMEDY 
AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS WAS 
MANDAMUS. 
POINT II 
NO REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED JUSTIFIED THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REFUSAL ·To PAY THE CLAIMS 
OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS. 
POINT III 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE BOARD 
OF EXAMINERS TO CCEXAMINE ALL CLAIMS" IS A 
PREREQUISITE TO BUT SUBORDINATE TO THE SOV-
EREIGN POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO ((PASS UP-
ON'' CLAIMS. 
POINT IV 
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS APPROPRIATING 
MONEY IN A GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT TO 
SATISFY CLAIMS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE EN-
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ACTMENT OF A PRIVATE LAW GRANTING ANY 
PRIVILEGE, IMMUNITY OR FRANCHISE TO AN INDI-
VIDUAL, ASSOCIATION OR CORPORATION AS PRO-
I-IIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ONLY PROPER AND ADEQUATE REMEDY 
AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS WAS 
MANDAMUS. 
The Appropriation Act of 1961, H.B. No. 282, Chapter 
185, Laws of Utah, 1961, appropriated money to the Attorney 
General for the benefit of plaintiffs and respondents and 
directed the Attorney General to pay them upon their signing 
releases prepared by the Attorney General. Plaintiffs and 
respondents offered to sign such releases. The only action 
required of the Attorney General then was the purely minis-
terial act of handing the vouchers to them. (See Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus, paragraphs 5 and 8, R. 2; Answer, para-
graph 1, R. 16; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
paragraphs 6 and 9, R. 40). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly indicate that 
mandamus '\vas the appropriate remedy in such a situation by 
providing in part in Rule 65B (b) (3) as follows: 
(((b) Grounds for Relief. Appropriate relief may be 
granted: 
* * * * 
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( 3) Where the relief sought is to compel any 
* * * * person to perform an act which the 
law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from 
an office; or to compel the admission of a 
party to the use and enjoyment of a right 
* * to which he is entitled and from which 
he is unlawfully excluded by such * * * 
person; * * . " 
The only thing which was required of the Attorney 
General was a mere ministerial act, and plaintiffs and re-
spondents, by the Appropriations Act, were clearly entitled 
as of right to receive payment but were unlawfully excluded 
therefrom by the Attorney General. 
It is provided in 55 C.J.S. 206 that: 
(( * * * Mandamus will lie to compel the attorney 
general to perform a ministerial duty, * * *. In addi-
tion, it has been held that mandamus will lie in cases 
where there is no other adequate remedy.'' 
See also 34 Am. Jur. 922 providing in part that: 
(( * * * If the act sought to be coerced is purely 
ministerial, the attorney general having no discretion 
or right to exercise his judgment in the matter, the 
writ may issue against him * * ." 
In his brief the Attorney General asserts at page 7 that 
((there is a serious question * * * whether the Attorney General 
has the right to pay claims * * * denied by the Board of Ex-
aminers and subsequently approved by the Legislature," which 
question ((should be resolved by the courts" and "this is the 
only erason why he has refused to pay the claims." 
In the first place, the Attorney General is wrong 'vhen 
he asserts that the claims of plaintiffs and respondents were 
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denied by the Board of Examiners. (See Statement of Facts 
in Respondents' brief). In the second place, if the Attorney 
General is sincere, why did he force plaintiffs and respondents 
to bear the trouble and expense of bringing an action against 
him? He could have brought some other remedy himself. Since 
he claims to be interested only in clearing up the legal questions 
involved, why does he question the propriety of a mandamus 
proceeding which will effectively determine the legal questions 
involved? 
POINT II 
NO REASONABLE. INTERPRETATION OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED JUSTIFIED THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REFUSAL TO PAY THE CLAIMS 
OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS. 
In his Points II, III, IV and V the Attorney General 
asserts that the Utah Constitution vests great power in the 
Board of Examiners with reference to claims but that these 
powers are not clearly defined. There is no argument but that 
the Board of Examiners does have great powers. He then 
asserts at page 8 that the Constitution creates a Board of 
Examiners with power ''to exa1nine, consider and act upon 
claims ... (Emphasis supplied). Article VII, Section 13 of the 
Utah Constitution, contrary to what the Attorney General 
asserts, merely provides in part: 
n * * * the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-
General shall constitute a Board of Examiners, with 
power to examine all claims against the State * * * . '· 
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The Attorney General then endeavors to torture the word 
"examine" to mean plenary power to dictate. See for example 
his statement at pages 16 and 17 of his brief where he says: 
"To allow the Legislature to pass claitns which have previously 
been denied after careful scrutiny by the Board, or to disallow 
claims which have been allowed by the Board, is not only an 
intereference with executive discretion, which does violence 
to the whole conception of the separation of powers, but also 
relegates the Board to a mere auditing body." His contention 
is that the Legislature has no discretion of its own with refer-
ence to claims but can do only what the Board of Examiners 
dictates. With due deference to the Attorney General we are 
unable to go along with him that the word 
braces such all inclusive power. 
cc • '' examtne em-
In the case of Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 
2d 221, 322 P. 2d 381, this Court had occasion to consider 
the powers of the Board of examiners as contrasted with the 
powers of the Board of Education. The Court had to decide 
whether the Board of Examiners or the Board of Education 
had superior power in controlling salaries and personnel prac-
tices of the Board of Education. The decision of the Court 
was in favor of the Board of Examiners based on the fact 
that the ultimate power of State government was in the Legis-
lature, which, by statute, had vested the power in question with 
the Board of Examiners. In the course of its decision this 
Court said: 
n * * Certain it is that one of the functions of 
Examiners is to investigate and act as a fact finder 
and advisor to the legislature on claims of that nature, 
such as tort claims, or other claims for damages or 
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con1pensation claimed for property, goods or services, 
by persons who would not otherwise have legal redress 
available." (Emphasis supplied). 
The Attorney General as chief legal officer of the State 
of Utah must certainly have been conversant with the funda-
mental and universally recognized principle involving the 
powers of state government that any restriction on the powers 
of the Legislature, which is the ultimate sovereign power of 
the state, must be strictly construed. As set forth in 16 C.J.S., 
Constitutional Law ss. 7, page 203: 
((A state constitution is construed strictly in favor 
of the state, and as not divesting it or its government 
of any of the prerogatives, unless the intent to do so 
is clearly expressed, and, generally speaking, it should 
be given a liberal and broad construction in favor of 
the power of the legislature. So, while a constitutional 
restriction or limitation is not to be construed so as 
to nullify it, a provision limiting or restricting legis-
lative power is strictly construed so as not to extend 
the limitation beyond its terms and so as to favor the 
power of the legislature." 
As this Court pointed out in the Bateman v. Board of Ex-
aminers case supra, at page 385 of 322 P. 2d: 
c c * * the fundamental power of government rests 
in the legislature." 
It is difficult to conceive of any interpretation of the 
word cc examine" which would support the position of the 
Attorney General that the constitutional power conferred upon 
the Board of Examiners to ccexamine" claims gives the Board 
of Examiners power to dictate to the Legislature and make 
the Legislature in essence a ccrubber stamp" of the Board of 
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Examiners. When the word nexan1ine," as used in the Utah 
Constitution, is interpreted in accordance with generally ap-
plicable rules of constitutional construction, no such inter-
pretation would justify the position taken by the Attorney 
General. 
POINT III 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE BOARD 
OF EXAMINERS TO ((EXAMINE ALL CLAIMS" IS A 
PREREQUISITE TO BUT SUBORDINATE TO THE SOV-
EREIGN POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO ((PASS UP-
ON" CLAIMS. 
Plaintiffs and respondents are well aware that this Court 
has held the State may not pay a claim until it has first been 
submitted to the Board of Examiners. It has never been held, 
however, that the power of the Board of Examiners to ((ex-
amine'' claims confers upon the Board of Examiners the power 
to proscribe the action which the Legislature may take in 
((passing uponn claims. 
In the early case of Thoreson v. State Board of Examiners, 
21 Utah 186, 60 P. 582, aff'g. 19 Utah 18, 57 P. 175, a case 
\vhere the Legislature had enacted a law directing the Board 
of Examiners to pay the claims of lessees of state school lands 
for the money they had paid under void leases, this Court 
held that the duty of the Board of Examiners to receive, audit 
and allow the claims under that law was mandatory and not 
discretionary. It should be particularly noted that the Legis-
lative enactment in the Thoreson case directed the Board of 
Examiners to pay those claims even though they had never 
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previously been submitted to the Board of Examiners. This 
Court said in the course of its opinion in 60 P. at page 582: 
tt * * * mandamus lies to enforce the performance 
of that ministerial duty * * * . '' 
The holdings in State v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 P. 720, 
and Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 P. 434, are 
only that before a claim against the State may be paid it must 
first be submitted to the Board of Examiners. 
The Supreme Courts of three other states having consti-
tutional provisions similar to that of Utah conferring power 
upon the Board of Examiners to "examine" claims have inter-
preted such power as not superior to the power of the Legis-
lature. 
The Nevada Constitution, Article V, Section 21, reads 
exactly like Article VII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution, 
providing in part that: 
"The governor, secretary of state, and attorney-
general shall constitute * * * a board of examiners 
with power to examine all claims against the state 
* * * , 
This was the earliest adoption of such a constitutional 
provision by any state, having been adopted by Nevada in 
1864, which pre-dated the adoption of the similar Utah con-
stitutional provision by approximately thirty years. At the 
time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution, the Supreme 
Court of Nevada had already had occasion to interpret the 
above - quoted provision of its Constitution and, since 
Utah adopted this particular provision of the Nevada Con-
stitution after it had been interpreted by its Supreme Court, 
10 
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the framers of the Utah Constitution are presumed to have 
adopted it as it had been interpreted by the Supreme Court 
of Nevada. 
In the case of State ex rel Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15 
(Jan. 1869), the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the 
institution of the Board of Examiners was not intended as a 
check on legislative extravagance, but to secure, as a pre-
requisite to legislative action, an examination of claims against 
the state. The Supreme Court of Nevada said: 
((The defendant contends that this section imposes 
the action of the Board of Examiners as a jurisdictional 
pre-requisiet to any legislative action upon any real 
or assun1ed claim against the State. * * * One premise 
of the position is, that the section creates the Board 
of Examiners as a check to legislative extravagance. 
* * *. The Board of Examiners was intended to sub-
serve an important purpose, but not that one which 
defendant insists. That it prescribes a prerequisite to 
to legislative action is true * * * and for that reason 
can apply only to such claims as require legislative 
action upon them as claims-not creative action but 
adoptive or rejective action." 
* * * * 
((The section, as has been said before, confers no 
power save that of examination upon the Board, there 
being no power of adjudication conferred, why not 
the Legislature, the ultimate tribunal, act without 
previous examination, that examination being of no 
binding force? While none of these considerations 
render it clear that the required pre-requisit~ of ex-
amination is of form rather than of substance, nor 
that the section, so far as the Legislature is concerned, 
is directory and not mandatory, yet it is impossible to 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
decide the contrary without a reasonable doubt. Such 
doubt existing, under the well-established rule of law, 
the statute cannot be declared unconstitutional, even 
as to the point now in question.'' 
In the case of State ex rel Lewis v. Doren, 5 Nev. 399, 
the Supreme Court of Nevada pointed out that the power of 
the Board of Examiners with reference to the legislature was 
only advisory and stated: 
lC * * * when that instrument (the Constitution) em-
powers the Board of Examiners to examine all claims, 
he (the Auditor) must exercise his power subject to 
such examination. What is this examination? Con-
fessed! y, by the words used, and as admitted by counsel 
on the argument of this case, with reference to the 
Legislatttre, only advisory." (Emphasis supplied). 
* * * * 
lC * * such power is neither idle nor nugatory. It may 
and probably does materially assist both the Legislature 
and Controller. It serves to give a fuller airing and 
ventilation of claims, than might or probably would 
follow one examinatoin-and to that extent, throws 
additional restraints and safeguards around the treas-
" ury. 
* * * * 
lC * * * the investigation is double, consequently 
more searching and protective." 
With reference to the State of Montana, in the case of 
State v. Erickson, 75 Mont. 429, 244 P. 287, the Montana 
Legislature made appropriations for specific purposes and the 
Board of Examiners attempted to scale down these appropriated 
funds. The Supreme Court of l\1ontana in denying the Board 
of Examiners this power stated: 
12 
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cc * * * Such attempted substitution of the judgment 
of executive officers for that of the legislative body 
constitutes a usurpation of legislative functions which 
cannot be permitted under our constitutional division 
of state government into its three co-ordinate depart-
ments * * * ." 
See also Mills v. Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 P. 262, and, 
State ex rel Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 101 P. 
962. 
Idaho also has a constitutional provision relating to the 
power of the Board of Examiners like that of Utah. The 
Attorney General in his brief at page 13 states that the Idaho 
Supreme Court has in substance ruled that the power of the 
Board of Examiners is c c absolute'', citing the case of Gem 
Irrigation District v. Gallet, 43 Idaho 519, 253 P. 128 (1927). 
The cited case does not so hold as a careful examination of 
that case will reveal. In that case the Legislature had made an 
appropriation and pursuant to that appropriation the Board 
of Examiners had allowed a claim which the Auditor had 
refused to pay. A writ of mandamus was brought to force the 
auditor to pay the claim. The question with which the Supreme 
Court of Idaho was therefore concerned was not a question 
of the power of the Board of Examiners versus the Legislature 
but a question of the power of the Board of Examiners and 
the Legislature versus the Auditor. In disposing of the matter 
the Supreme Court of Idaho said: 
((The state board of examiners having allowed the 
claim, it was the auditor's duty to honor its action, 
unless he found the act authorizing such allowance 
invalid * * * ." 
1.3 
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The Idaho Supreme Court said also at 253 P. at page 131 in 
regard to the Legislative Act: 
(( * * * the Legislature has determined that the state 
shall receive its quid pro quo. The state gives nothing; 
it lends nothing; it recognizes and discharges a moral 
obligation for past benefits accrued and of necessity 
further to accrue. The sole object of th~ act was the 
creation and maintenance of a public use. Whether 
or not the Legislature acted wisely is beside the issue. 
It had the constitutional right to do as it did * * * ." 
The case of Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311, 341 P. 2d 
432, was a mandamus action against the State Auditor to 
compel him to pay claims for the construction of a building 
for which an appropriation had been made by the Legislature. 
In the course of its decision the Supreme Court of Idaho said: 
((We therefore hold that the claims involved in this 
case must be first presented to the Board of Examiners 
for examintion, as well as all other claims against the 
Highway Fund, 'excepting salary or compensation of 
officers fixed by law,' as required by Idaho Const. 
A 4 18 * * * , rt. , ss. . 
"This does not mean, however, that the Board of 
Examiners is vested with authority by either the Con-
stitution or statute to override the expressed will of 
the Legislature. By our Constitution the power to 
make and determine policy for the government of 
the State is vested in the Legislature, * * * . 
((The Legislature having considered and determined 
the necessity for the building authorized by Chapter 83, 
and that its construction is in the interest of the people 
of the State, and having by the enactment of said 
Chapter approved the project by appropriating funds 
for its construction, the Board of Exan1iners is without 
14 
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power to veto the act, or reverse the policy thus de-
clared, by refusing to approve valid claims properly 
presented, in execution thereof. As to such claims, the 
authority of the Board of Examiners is limited to deter-
mining that the claims are in proper form, properly 
certified to the State Auditor by the Department of 
Highways, and chargeable against the appropriations." 
In the case of Padget v. Williams, ____ Idaho ____ , 350 P. 
2d. 3 53, the Supreme Court of Idaho again had occasion to 
consider the power of the Board of Examiners with reference 
to a claim which the Board of Examiners had refused to pay. 
The Supreme Court ordered the claim paid stating in the course 
of its opinion: 
ccln support of his motion made at the meeting of 
the board of examiners on February 26th, the attorney 
general cited a number of prior decisions of this court. 
All of these decisions have been heretofore considered 
by the court, a number of them being cited in Rich 
v. Williams, supra, and in this case. All but two of 
them were cited by the attorney general in the briefs 
submitted by him in these two cases. In so far as any 
of those decisions may be in conflict with the decision 
in Rich v. William.r or the decision herein, the same 
are hereby overruled * * * " (Emphasis supplied.) 
* * * * 
CCThe absurdity of the attorney general's contention, 
and of any recognition by this court of the authority 
which he claims for the state board of examiners, 
become apparent when fol~owed to its logical conclu-
sion * * . In short, the attorney general's contention 
is reduced to the absurdity of an attempt to confer upon 
the state board of examiners power to overrule the will 
of the legislature, and to render nugatory any legis-
lative act providing for the carrying on of any function 
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of the state government which requires the expenditure 
of money. 
t tT rue, the board of examiners is a constitutional 
tribunal, with the constitutionally vested power to 
examine all claims against the state. But, nevertheless, 
it is also only an arm of the executive department of 
the state government. The authority now claimed would 
make it the supreme authority in state government, 
with power to control or nullify the acts and functions 
of all three of the major departments of the state gov-
ernnzent- executive, legislative, and }udicial. Such 
power, the constitution does not confer upon it. The 
power to examine all claims against the state does not 
extend that far * * ." (Emphasis supplied). 
The aforesaid expressions by the Supreme Courts of all 
the states having constitutional provisions similar to Utah 
decisively establish that while the Board of Examiners has 
great powers, its powers are subordinate to those of the Legis-
lature. 
This fact is even more clearly so in Utah. The Utah 
Constitution is unique in that the provisions establishing the 
Board of Examiners is prefaced with the phrase ((until other-
wise provided by law." Respondents respectfully submit that 
the Utah Legislature can completely abolish the presently con-
stituted Board of Examiners. This being the case, it is utterly 
ridiculous to contend, as does the Attorney General, that the 
power of the Board of Examiners with reference to claims 
is superior to the power of the Legislature. 
The Attorney General seeks to make much of the difference 
tn the powers of the Board of Examiners in regard to nun-
liquidated" claims prior to a policy determination by the 
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Legislature as opposed to ccliquidated" claims. Rsepondents 
fail to see how their claim can be more ccliquidated" than in 
the present case \vhere the Legislature, after hearings, made 
a policy declaration to pay the same and specified the amounts 
to be paid. 
POINT IV 
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS APPROPRIATING 
MONEY IN A GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT TO 
SATISFY CLAIMS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE EN-
ACT1v1ENT OF A PRIVATE LAW GRANTING ANY 
PRIVILEGE, IMMUNITY OR FRANCHISE TO AN INDI-
VIDUAL, ASSOCIATION OR CORPORATION AS PRO-
HIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION. 
In his argument under Point VI of his brief at pages 14 and 
15 the Attorney General asserts that when the Board of Exami-
ners has denied claims ccfor the reason that there is no legal 
or moral obligation against the state," if the Legislature allows 
those claims, ccit grants a special privilege immunity or fran-
chise." May we point out again that the Board of Examiners 
never denied these claims. The record shows conclusively that 
the Board of Examiners transmitted each claim to the Legis-
lature merely c cwith the recotnmendation that the claim be 
denied." The further statement by the Attorney General that 
the claims were denied ccfor the reason that there is no legal 
or moral obligation against the state" is purely a figment of 
his imagination without a scintilla of evidence in the record 
to support it. 
The Attorney General paid many claims similar to those 
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of respondents which the Board of Examiners had transmitted 
to the Legislature with its recommendation that they be ap-
proved and many which the Board of Examiners had trans-
mitted to the Legislature without any recommendation. The 
Attorney General apparently would have us believe that when 
the Board of Examiners transmits a claim to the Legislature 
without recommendation or with its recommendation that it 
be approved, a halo of righteousness is thus cast upon such 
claim, so that it does not bear the stigma of private legislation 
prohibited by the Constitution. If the Attorney General is not 
serious in this ridiculous assertion, he is faced with the other 
alternative of having knowingly paid out state money wrong-
fully pursuant to the terms of a statute which he contends is 
invalid as being private legislation. 
Respondents submit that the act of the Legislature in 
making appropriations to satisfy claims against the State in 
a General Appropriations Act is general and not special or 
private legislation as prohibited by the Constitution. May it 
be noted that the General Appropriations Act made provision 
for payment for all members of that class who had claims 
against the State and whose claims the Legislature determined 
as a matter of policy should be paid. In 82 C.J.S. Statutes, 
Section 163, page 273, it is provided as follows: 
(( * * * The test of whether a statute so operating 
falls within constitutional limitations and inhibitions 
on the right to enact special or local legislation becomes, 
ordinarily, the propriety of the classification resorted 
to by the legislature. Although the class must be legiti-
mately constituted, it is competent for the legislature 
to classify objects of legislation. It has a large discretion 
in this respect, and, if the classification is reasonable, or 
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in accordance with the judicial decisions on the question 
is natural, and appropriate for the occasion, is single 
and not a double or reclassification, is not artificial 
or arbitrary, unjust or capricious, and rests on some 
substantial difference or situation or circumstances 
inc..~:ating the necessity or propriety of legislation re-
stricted to the class created, it will be upheld." 
Only by such legislation can the State meet its moral obligation 
to pay just claims against it. 
In the case of Mills v. Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 P. 332, 
the Montana Legislature had made an appropriation to recom-
pense a student who was injured on bleachers at a State Uni-
versity. In its decision holding the appropriaton valid the 
Supreme Court of Montana said: 
((We do not discover any provision of our Constitu-
tion which forbids the Legislature to assume liability 
for injury resulting from the negligence of the State's 
agent, whether the liability is assumed before or after 
the injury occurs, and to say that the state may assume 
such liability but may not discharge it is simply to 
make the law ridiculous. United States v. Realty Co., 
163 U.S. 427, 16 S. Ct. 1120, 41 L. Ed. 215. Common 
sense is the essence of the law, and that which is not 
good sense is not good law.'' 
While as pointed out above, the Utah Act was a general 
and not a special or private Act, the Supreme Court of Hawaii, 
held that even a private act which the Legislature of Hawaii 
had enacted making an appropriation to satisfy certain moral 
claims was not in violation of its organic act prohibiting grants 
of "special or exclusive privilege." In upholding the validity 
of that Act the Court said: 
((No one questions the right and power of the legis-
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lature to hold hearings for the purpose of eliciting 
facts so as to make a determination of appropriate 
legislative action. It does no more than that in the 
enactment of legislation recognizing moral obligations 
and necessarily so, since it alone possesses the power 
to grant such relief. * * * the legislature is the keeper 
of the State's conscience. It alone possesses the means 
to salve that conscience. * * * ." 
See Koike v. Board of Water Supply, City & Co. of Honolulu, 
Hawaii, 352 P. 2d 835. 
This Honorable Court has announced that any person 
having a claim against the State, the settlement of which is not 
otherwise provided by law, should present the same to the 
Board of Examiners and to the Legislature. See H jorth v. 
Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P 2d 907; Campbell Build-
ing Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P 2d 857; 
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626. 
It would be the height of absurdity to recognize that a 
person having a claim against the State, the settlement of which 
is not otherwise provided by law, should present his claim to 
the Board of Examiners and to the Legislature, and, then, to 
hold that the legislative enactment making provision for the 
payment of that claim is unconstitutional because it is private 
legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
A careful consideration and analysis of the facts in this 
case and the law applicable thereto demonstrates that the 
Attorney General arbitrarily, capriciously and without right, 
refused to pay respondents the sums appropriated to them 
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by the Legislature as a valid and constitutional exercise of the 
legislative power. The judgment and mandate of the District 
Court that the Attorney General pay said claims forthwith 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. N. OTTOSEN 
Attorney for May Amelia Wood 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Hazel Stevens 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON 
Attorney for Lloyd Warner-
Guardian for Nancy Louise Ovard 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Attorney Jar Wayne John Sterling 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON 
Attorney for Dean J. Hadfield 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
